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Economic intuition suggests that increased competition generates lower prices.  However, recent 
theoretical work shows that a monopolist may charge a lower price than a firm facing a 
competitor selling a differentiated product.  The direction of the price change when competition 
is introduced is dependent upon the joint distribution of buyer values for the two products.  We 
explore this relationship using controlled laboratory experiments.  Our results indicate that the 
distribution of buyer values does affect prices in a manner consistent with the theoretical 
predictions, although price increasing competition is rare due in part to overly intense 
competition regardless of the distribution of buyer values.  We also explore pricing dynamics 
and find that sellers are more sensitive to their rivals when buyer values are positively correlated.  
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Received economic wisdom holds that competition leads to lower prices, but this need not be 
true.  For example, if consumers have search costs, then more competitors can actually lead to 
higher prices (Satterthwaite 1979, Stiglitz 1987, Schulz and Stahl 1996, and Janssen and 
Moraga-González 2004).  The same result can hold when some customers are captive and thus 
firms only compete for a fraction of the other shoppers as in Rosenthal (1980).  However, the 
internet and other technological advances are causing search costs to become smaller, perhaps 
making these models less relevant.  At the same time, businesses are now collecting more and 
more information about consumers from tracking their actions online to combing through 
mountains of checkout scanner data.  This affords sellers a more granular picture of how 
consumers’ values for different products are interrelated and enables firms to offer ever more 
product differentiation.   
Chen and Riordan (2008), hereafter C&R, demonstrate that competition can lead to higher or 
lower prices depending on how buyer view the relationship between goods.  Specifically, C&R 
consider the case where buyers value two differentiated goods, but desire to purchase at most one.  
A single good monopolist offers one of the two products ignoring the buyers’ values for the 
second good, while duopolists have to weigh the market share effect of lowering price with the 
price sensitivity of its buyers.  As a result, under certain assumptions, if the distribution of buyer 
values exhibits strong negative correlation then the monopoly price is actually below the duopoly 
price while the reverse is true if values are positively correlated. 
C&R argue that this counter-intuitive pricing result is really unexceptional and may help explain 
seemingly anomalous empirical studies that have found competition has led to increased prices 
(for example Perloff, Suslow, and Seguin 2006 find this pricing pattern in the pharmaceutical 
industry and Thomadsen 2007 finds it in the fast food industry).  While the model of C&R may 
explain such behavior, the existence of unobservable variables such as the actual distribution of 
buyer values and the endogenous market structure make direct inference difficult.  By contrast, 
the laboratory offers an opportunity to exogenously control the critical market conditions 
identified by the model.  Thus, the laboratory offers an ideal complement to other empirical 
studies of pricing behavior for testing the theoretical predictions of C&R, which have obvious 
anti-trust implications.    
This paper reports on controlled laboratory experiments directly considering the interaction of 
market structure and the joint distribution of buyer values.  As a prelude to the results, we find 
that competition can have a positive effect on prices as predicted by C&R.  However, this effect 
is offset by duopolists being overly competitive and a behavioral response to pricing in markets 
with goods that have negatively correlated values.  This finding demonstrates the value of 
controlled laboratory experiments for setting up counterfactuals affording difference in 
difference analysis.   A field study in a particular industry that generated the same prices before 
and after entry or a merger would have drawn incomplete conclusions. 2 
 
Our experimental design also allows us to examine two other issues that are not directly 
observable with naturally occurring data:  market structure policy prescriptions and pricing 
dynamics.  Specifically, we consider policy implications such as forcing a monopolist to divest 
or discontinue a product line or allowing two firms to merge.  We find no evidence that the 
sequence of market structures impacts behavior.  That is, monopolists operating after 
experiencing competition behave similarly to monopolists who have never faced competition and 
previous experience as a monopolist has no lasting effect on competitive behavior.  With respect 
to pricing dynamics, we find that duopolists are more responsive to their rivals when buyer 
values are positively correlated.  In all of our markets, sellers are either reacting to each other or 
one seller is in the role of a market leader.  Further, while we do observe some cases of rockets 
and feathers price responses, where prices rise faster than they fall, in general reactions to rivals 
are symmetric regardless of buyer values.   
Experimental Design 
To evaluate the predictive power of C&R, two joint distributions for buyer values are used 
(positively correlated and negatively correlated) and three market structures are used (a single 
good monopolist, differentiated goods duopolists, and a monopolist offering both of the 
differentiated products) for a total of 6 experimental treatments in a 2×3 experimental design.   
Following C&R, buyers are assumed to have values (maximum willingnesses to pay) for two 
goods A and B, but be willing to purchase at most one item.  A buyer’s values for goods A and B 
are denoted VA and VB, respectively.  In the positive correlation treatment, the value pair (VA,VB) 
is drawn from the uniform distribution over the region [0,100]×[0,100] subject to |VA – VB| ≤ 50.  
For the negative correlation treatment, buyer values were drawn from the uniform distribution 
over the region [0,100]×[0,100] subject to 50 ≤ VA + VB ≤ 150.  The correlation between VA and 
VB is +0.5 for the positive correlation treatment and –0.5 for the negative correlation treatment.  
For simplicity, seller costs are assumed to be 0.
1   
We explore market behavior using the posted offer institution in which sellers post take–it–or–
leave–it prices.  This type of market is commonly employed in economics experiments to 
describe retail markets (see Davis and Holt 1993). A single good monopolist in our experiment 
sets PA, the price of good A, and good B is not available for purchase.  A two good monopolist 
simultaneously sets both PA and PB, the price of good B.  In the case of a duopoly, one seller 
picks PA while a different seller simultaneously sets PB.  Table 1 gives the optimal prices for 
each treatment.  The optimal price in the single good monopoly the same for both value 
distributions because the marginal distribution of VA is the same in both cases.  However, this 
distribution is not uniform because consumers are more likely to have values closer to the 
median; it is a symmetric truncated triangular distribution.  Given the parameters, the single good 
monopoly price is 45.   
                                                            
1 This structure is similar to that reported in Aloysius, et al. (2010) which uses a similar subject interface to explore 
the effect of allowing firms to sequentially set prices for multiple goods.   3 
 
The surprising result of C&R is the price increase from 45 with a single good monopolist to 47 
with duopolists when buyer values are negatively correlated.  The intuitive explanation for this 
result is that when a rival enters the market, the customers it attracts away from the incumbent 
have relatively low values for the incumbent’s product.  With these customers purchasing from 
the new entrant, the relative distribution of values for the incumbent customers shifts to the right.  
With the parameters, the nominal change in price is small, but the ability to increase this 
difference is limited and further complicated by a need for a distribution that is easy to explain to 
subjects.  The large drop in price, from 45 to 32, for the same introduction of a competitor when 
values are positively correlated thus provides an important basis of comparison for evaluating the 
predictions of C&R.  Notice that with positively correlated values, the new entrant is attracting 
both high and low value customers away from the incumbent. 
Table 1.  Profit Maximizing Prices by Treatment 
Market Structure  Positively Correlated Values  Negatively Correlated Values 
Duopoly PA = PB = 32  PA = PB = 47 
Single Good Monopoly  PA = 45  PA = 45 
Two Good Monopoly  PA = PB = 50  PA = PB = 55 
 
In our experiments, subject sellers post prices for truthfully revealing computerized buyers.
2 A 
buyer visits the market every 3 seconds (called a period), observes the relevant price(s) and 
makes a purchase decision based upon the randomly determined values of VA and VB.  Sellers 
receive feedback every period regarding their own profit and their rival’s price, if they are 
competing in a duopoly market.  Our sellers can update their own prices at any time.  As 
documented by Davis and Korenok (2009, p. 465), this approach “does indeed improve the 
drawing power of underlying equilibrium predictions.” As argued by Hampton and Sherstyuk 
(2010), to better replicate naturally occurring markets our duopoly sellers faced the same rival 
each period as is common in many market experiments.  This design choice is expected to 
facilitate collusion (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2002; Huck, et al. 2004), which should increase 
duopoly prices relative to those shown in the top row of Table 1.
3 Having a fixed matching 
protocol also affords an opportunity to explore pricing dynamics as seller’s respond to each other.  
A sample screen shot is shown in Figure 1 for the duopoly market with positively correlated 
values.  In addition to the feedback that subjects received every period (shown in the top right), 
they also had a “What if” tool that would identify the purchase decision of each buyer type for 
                                                            
2 Buyers demand at most one unit and, therefore, demand under-revelation is not an optimal buyer response.If 
buyers demand multiple units, then they may have market power which would enable them to under-reveal their 
demand, push prices down unilaterally generating more surplus for themselves.  With a single unit of demand, 
under-revelation assures the buyer earns 0 and therefore the buyer would prefer to truthfully reveal demand by 
making a purchase at any price equal to or less than the buyer’s value.  For a comparison of human and computer 
buyers in situations with market power, see Brown Kruse (2008).  
3 While the set-up of C&R is a one shot game, pilot sessions conducted with subject sellers being randomly 
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prices for a series of possible buyer values.  Once all subjects had completed the directions and 
had any questions answered privately, the first phase of the experiment began with each subject 
setting an initial price or prices.  Once all of the subjects made this initial decision, buyers began 
visiting the market and making purchase decisions.  The total number of periods in the market 
was unknown to the subjects.  After the initial phase was completed, the second phase followed a 
similar process beginning with market structure specific computerized directions.  After the 
second phase was completed, subjects were paid their earnings in private and dismissed from the 
experiment.  Seller profits were converted to $US payments to the subjects at the rate 400 Profit 
= $1 US.  The average salient payment was $24.20 for the approximately one hour experiment.   
Subjects also received a $7.00 participation payment.
6 
Table 2.Summary of Experiential Design 
Condition 
Phase 1  
Market 
Structure 
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We observed a total of 19,200 pricing decisions from 32 subject sellers (four replicates of each 
condition).  These data are not independent, which we account for in subsequent statistical 
analysis.  The results section is broken into two parts.  In the first we consider the treatment 
effects.  In the second we consider the dynamics of our duopoly markets. 
                                                            
6 This payment is standard at the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University where the experiments were 
conducted.  The subjects were drawn from the undergraduate population at Chapman University.  Some of the 
subjects had participated in other economics experiments, but none had previously been in any related experiments.     6 
 
Treatment Effects 
The average single good monopoly price across all observations was 43.54, which is nominally 
similar to the predicted price of 45.  For duopolists, the average price was 29.03 when buyer 
values were positively correlated, not dissimilar to the predicted price of 32.  When buyer values 
were negatively correlated, the average duopoly price was 31.39, similar to the positive 
correlation case and a change in the opposite direction from what was predicted. 
This pattern seems to question the predictive success of C&R.  However, this cursory 
comparison masks the result that single good monopoly prices differed dramatically based upon 
the correlation of buyer values even though this is theoretically irrelevant.  The average single 
good monopoly price with positively correlated values 48.12, but the average single good 
monopoly price with negatively correlated value was only 38.96.  A similar behavioral pattern is 
observed for two good monopolists as well.  The average price set in the two good monopoly 
environment is 52.85 with positive correlation and only 48.25 with negative correlation even 
though the price is predicted to be 5 greater with negative correlation.  Across all market 
structures, prices are systematically lower when buyer values are negatively correlated.   
Similarly, for both types of buyer values the change from a single good monopoly to a duopoly 
leads to price falling too much.
7  In the case of positively correlated goods, the price reduction is 
50% larger than predicted.   
An overreaction to competition and a general price reduction due to goods being negatively 
correlated make observing the anticipated price increasing effect of competition unlikely.  Still, 
one of our positively correlated buyer markets did see a higher average price under duopoly (PA 
= 39.44) than under a single good monopolist (PA = 36.63).  The two identified behavioral 
patterns demonstrate the strength of laboratory research.  By systematically controlling the 
variables of interest, one can identify treatment effects while controlling for commonalties across 
treatments.  We do this by relying upon a linear mixed effects model where treatment effects are 
fixed but each subject has a random effect.  This statistical approach allows us to fully exploit 
our data and controls for the repeated measures in the observations.  Specifically we estimate the 
following model. 
Pit= + 1Duopolyi+ 22Monopolyi+ 1Negativei 
+1Negativei×Duopolyi+Negativei×2Monopolyi+ i + it         (1) 
Pit denotes the price set by subject i in period t.
8 Duopoly and 2Monopoly are dummy variables 
for the market structure and Negative is a dummy variable for the correlation of buyer values.  i 
is a subject specific random effect i.i.d. (0, 
2) and it is an decision error term i.i.d (0,
2). 
                                                            
7 This result also suggests that the fixed matching protocol did not facilitate collusion as duopoly prices are 
dramatically lower than those set by two good monopolists regardless of the distribution of buyer values. 
8 For a subject i in the role of a two good monopolist,Pit denotes the average of PA and PB in period t.  7 
 
Before presenting our analysis of the estimation of the equilibrium price level, we recall that 
each subject seller participates in two treatments: an oligopoly market and a monopoly market. 
We separately estimated the following regression for each of the three treatments to analyze 
whether any order effect exists or not:  Pit= + 1Dummy_orderi+ i + eit.  In this specification, 
Pit is the period t average price in duopoly market i, price set by single good monopolist i, or the 
average price set two good monopolist i, depending on treatment.  Dummy_order is a dummy 
variable for the treatment occurring during phase 1 of the experiment.  whether or not the 
condition was .  i  is an individual specific random effect, i.i.d. (0, 
2). The t-statistics for 
Dummy_order are -0.142, -0.733 and -0.531 for the duopoly, single good monopoly, and two 
good monopoly treatments, respectively.  None of these coefficients are significant and we 
conclude that there was no order effect and combine all of the data from a given treatment in our 
subsequent analysis.  This result implies that there is no lasting effect on a monopolist from 
having experienced competition nor is there a lasting effect on competitive firms from having 
been monopolists regardless of the distribution of buyer values.  The implication is that it is 
reasonable for policy makers to focus on the post proscription market structure without worrying 
about the history that led up to that point.     
The estimation results for (1) are reported in Table 3.
9   The baseline case is a single good 
monopolist facing customers who have positively correlated values.  Thus the expectation is that 
 = 45, from which it is statistically indistinguishable.  The effect of adding competition to this 
baseline case is captured by 1, which is estimated to be –19.09 and is statistically different from 
the predicted value of –13 providing evidence of an overreaction to competition.  The effect of 
changing customer values to being positively correlated for a single good monopolist is captured 
by 1, which is estimated to be –9.17 and is statistically different from the predicted value of 0 
providing evidence of a behavioral response to the correlation of buyer values. The effect of 
introducing competition when buyer values are negatively correlated is 1 + 1, which is 
estimated to be –7.56 and is statistically different from the predicted value of +2.  Thus we do 
not observe nominal prices increasing with competition when buyer values are negatively 
correlated.  However, the difference between the effect of competition when goods are positively 
correlated and when goods are negatively correlated is captured by 1 and predicted to be 15.  
The estimated value of this difference in differences is 11.52 and is not significantly different 
from 15, affirming the counter intuitive predictions of C&R.  
For the two goods monopolists, both 2 and 2 are predicted to be 5 and are statistically 
indistinguishable from it indicating that the treatment effect of changing from a single good 
monopolist to a multiple good monopolist is as expected for both types of customer values.   Due 
to the large negative value of 1, observed prices for a two good monopolist facing consumers 
with negatively correlated values are too low as + 1 + 2 + 2 is statistically less than 55.  
                                                            
9 The results in Table 3 remain largely unchanged if the analysis is restricted to periods in the second half of the 
duopoly market.  This is consistent with results discussed later that indicate behavior is stable across time.    8 
 
Observed prices for two good monopolists facing customers with positively correlated values are 
as predicted, i.e. + 2 = 50. 
 
Table 3.  Statistical Analysis Based Upon Linear Mixed Effects Model 
Estimation of Pi,t= + 1Duopolyi+ 22Monopolyi+ 
1Negativei+1Negativei×Duopolyi+Negativei×2Monopolyi+ i + i,t 
 
Parameter Coefficient  Estimate  Standard  Error  Ho:  p-value 
  Constant 48.12  3.09  = 45  0.312 
1  Duopoly  –19.09 4.73  1= –13  <0.001 
2  2Monopoly  4.73 4.37  2 = 5  0.950 
1  Negative  –9.17 4.37 1= 0  0.036 
1  Negative×Duopoly 11.53  6.17  1 = 15  0.574 
  Negative×2Monopoly 4.56  6.18  = 5  0.944 
        
Price Predictions 
Buyer Values  Market Structure  Ho: Estimate  p-value 
Positive  Single Good Monopoly   48.12 0.312 
Positive Two  Good  Monopoly  + 2 = 50  52.85 0.357 
Positive Duopoly  + 1 = 32  29.03 0.336 
Negative  Single Good Monopoly  + 1 = 45  38.95 0.050 
Negative Two  Good  Monopoly  + 1 + 2 + = 55  48.25 <0.001 
Negative Duopoly  + 1 + 1 + = 47  31.39 0.000 
     
Treatment Effects 
Buyer Values  Treatment Effect  Ho: Estimate  p-value 
Positive  Single Good Monopoly  
 Duopoly 
1= –13 –19.09 <0.001 
Negative  1 + = 2  0.029 
Positive  Single Good Monopoly  
 Two Good Monopoly 
2 = 5 4.73 0.950 




Dynamics in the Duopoly Markets 
Our data set also allows us to examine the dynamic interaction of the duopolists and see if this 
interaction differs with the distribution of values.
10  In the case of negatively correlated values, 
the market share effect associated with a price change is small as compared to the positive 
                                                            
10 This analysis is also important because, while the model of Chen and Riordan (2008) is a one shot game, many 
naturally occurring markets are better described as repeated play games.   9 
 
correlation case because fewer customers are indifferent between the two sellers at any given 
price pair.  Therefore, we would expect that dupolists are more sensitive to their rivals when 
buyer values are positively correlated.     
First, we ask whether or not subjects are in fact reacting to each other.  For this we rely upon 
both a Granger (1969) causality test of lagged rival price controlling for own lagged price and 
the construction of a VAR model of prices.  For the Granger causality test, we consider whether 
adding the lagged value of one’s rival’s price improves the estimation of an autoregressive model 
of one’s own duopoly price.  The reduced-form bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) model lag 






























     (3) 
where yt and xt denote period t prices by the two sellers,  ) , 0 .( . . ~
2
, i t i d i i u  for i = 1, 2 and the 
length p is determined by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or Schwarz Criterion (SIC). If the 
coefficients  p i i ,..., 1,2 , , 1    in equation (2) are jointly significant different from zero, the null 
hypothesis that x does not Granger causes y  will be rejected.  Similarly, if the coefficients 
p j j ,..., 2 , 1 , , 2    in equation (3) are jointly significant different from zero, the null hypothesis 
y  does not Granger causes x will be rejected. 
These results are important for parallelism between the lab and the field.  If our sellers were not 
reacting to each other, then it would be unclear how valid our comparative results would be 
outside the lab assuming naturally occurring duopolists do react to their rivals.  However, this is 
not the case here as our subject sellers are quickly responding to each other.  Table 4 provides 
the statistical analysis.  The first two columns in Table 4 give the p-value of the Granger 
Causality test for the positively related values. The last two columns give the results of 
negatively related values.  Markets 1 to 4 are the sessions where the subjects experienced 
duopoly first.  Markets 5 to 8 are the sessions where the subjects are initially monopolists.
11 
For all 16 pairs of subjects, we observe that market prices are reacting to previous prices. In half 
of the positively correlated buyer value sessions both sellers are reacting to their rival.  The other 
half can be described as cases where there is a market leader who does not respond to his rival, 
                                                            
11 The market number is for expositional purposes.  As discussed in the experiential design section, multiple sessions 
and treatments were conducted concurrently.  It was not the case that all duopoly first experiments were conducted 
prior to the monopoly first experiments.  The designation of PA and PB is arbitrary and done for exposition.  All 
subjects had information presented to them as though he or she sold good A and that one’s rival sold good B.   All 
single good monopolists sold good A.       10 
 
but is responded to by his rival.  For the markets with negatively correlated values, there were 
three instances in which both sellers strongly Granger caused each other to adjust prices and the 
five remaining markets had a market leader.  There is no apparent difference between markets 
with positively and negatively correlated buyer values nor is there anything to suggest an order 
effect.  
Table 4.  p-values Associated with Test that Rival’s Price GrangerCauses Own Price 
  Positive Correlation  Negative Correlation 
  Ho: PAdoes not 
Granger Causes PB 
Ho: PB does not 
Granger Causes PA 
 
 
Ho: PA does not 
Granger Causes PB 
Ho: PB does not 
Granger Causes PA 
Market 1  <0.001  <0.001  0.201  0.067 
Market 2  <0.001  0.056  <0.001  0.036 
Market 3  0.791  0.001  <0.001  0.005 
Market 4  <0.001  0.951  0.005  0.522 
Market 5  0.001  0.605  0.750  <0.001 
Market 6  0.164  0.017  <0.001  0.193 
Market 7  <0.001  0.093  0.003  0.809 
Market 8  0.010  <0.001  0.007  0.029 
 
Next we turn to a VAR model of pricing dynamics.   We check each duopoly market’s price path 
for a unit root based on augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  For 31 of the 32 sellers we can 
strongly reject the existence of a unit root implying that these sellers have stationary prices that 
we can investigate using a VAR model based on the price levels. Optimal lag length is 
determined jointly for the two sellers in a market using the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC).  
For 12 marketsthe best lag length is 1, a three second delay in responding.  For three of the 
markets the best lag length is 2 and for the remaining market it is 4.
12 Of the markets with 
negatively correlated values, only one market had a lag length greater than 1 and it had a lag of 2.   
Figures 2 and 3 plot the impulse response functions for the effect of a change in one’s rival price 
on one’s own price for each subject in the positively and negatively correlated buyer value 
conditions, respectively.  The solidlines are the impulse response of one duopolist to its rival’s 
price change. The dashed lines give the 95 percent confidence interval for the impulse response 
function. All these results are consistent with the conclusion of the Granger Causality tests.  
Again, there is no evidence of an ordering effect. 
In comparing the impulse response functions of the duopolists across buyer value treatments, the 
magnitudes of the impulse response functions are larger and in the positively correlated buyer 
values condition than in the negatively correlated condition.  More specifically, in the positively 
correlated values case, there are 10 statistically significant impulse response functions excluding 
the one with non-stationary price levels (Market 6).  The largest peak, in Market 1, is 3.9.  Four 
                                                            
12One of the markets with an estimated lag length of 1 includes the seller with non-stationary prices.   11 
 
of the peaks are larger than 2.6 and seven are greater than 1.2.  However, in the negatively 
related values condition where there are 9 statistically significant impulse response functions, six 
of them have peaks less than 1.2 and the largest peak is only 2, in Market 3. 
Another treatment difference is that response speeds are faster with positively correlated buyer 
values. Of the 10 significant impulse response functions with positively correlated buyer values, 
four peak by the fifth period and all but two peak by the seven period, whereas all but one of the 
9 significant impulse response functions with negative values peaks in the seven period or later.   
Figure 2: Impulse Response Function to Cholesky One Standard Deviation Innovation 
for Duopolists with Positively Correlated Values 
Panel (a): Duopoly First Markets 










Panel (b): Monopoly First Markets 
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A In this market, one of two sellers prices is nonstationary. 
  13 
 
Figure 3: Impulse Response Function to Cholesky One Standard Deviation Innovation 
for Duopolists with Negatively Correlated Values 
Panel (a): Duopoly First Markets 









Panel (b): Monopoly First Markets 










We verify this apparent treatment effect on the short run partial adjustment between duopolists 
with the following model based upon all 16 markets by 400 periods.   
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        
 
t i P, is the price set by seller i in period t.  The treatment effect is captured by i  , which equals 1 if 
the duopolist is in a market with positively correlated buyer values and is 0 otherwise.  PAi,t and 
PBi,t denote the prices of A and B, respectively.   i u is the i.i.d.(0, 
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effect. The estimation results, calculated separately for cases where subject i set PA and PB, are 
shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Panel Estimation of the Price Responses on Duopoly Market 
  i sells good A    i sells good B 






Constant  2.759** 0.343    1.188** 0.264 
Δ  -0.943* 0.448    0.508  0.344 
PAt-1  0.888** 0.008    -0.004  0.013 
PAt-2  . .    0.101**  0.018 
PAt-3  . .    -0.074**  0.014 
PAt-1×δ  -0.026* 0.012    0.082** 0.019 
PAt-2×δ  . .    -0.021 0.025 
PAt-3×δ  . .    -0.022 0.019 
PBt-1  0.032 0.026  0.936**  0.007 
PBt-2  -0.006 0.026   .  . 
PBt-3  .     . . 
PBt-1×δ  -0.022 0.033  -0.057** 0.010 
PBt-2×δ  0.069* 0.033    . . 
PBt-3×δ  .     . . 
* Significant on 5% level;** Significant on 1% level. 
 
The coefficients on PBt-i×δ for subjects setting PA and the coefficients on PAt-i×δ for subjects 
setting PB capture the treatment effect associated with the distribution of buyer valueson seller 
reactions.  These coefficients are shown in bold in Table 5.  For both estimations there is only 
one significant coefficient and it is positive (0.069 for good A sellers and 0.082 for good B 
sellers), confirming the previous conclusions.  Duopolists are more sensitive to price changes by 
their rivals when buyers values are positively correlated as the magnitude of the response is 
larger in this case. 
The results confirm that the magnitude of responses is larger and the speed of responses is faster 
when duopolists are operating in markets where the buyers have positively correlated buyers.  
This indicates that buyers are in fact more responsive to their rivals in when buyer values are 
positively correlated as anticipated. 
Having established that our sellers are responding to each other, we now ask if there are 
asymmetries in those responses; that is do we find evidence of a rockets and feathers 
phenomenon where prices rise faster than they fall.  This issue has received considerable 
attention in gasoline markets (e.g. Borenstein et al., 1997 and Johnson, 2002), but is not unique 
to gasoline markets (Peltzman 2000).  Green and Porter (1984) shown that such pricing behavior 
can result from seller coordination using a “trigger price” strategy, but it can also result from 
inventory costs and consumer search costs (see e.g. Johnson 2002, Castanias and Johnson 1993).  15 
 
In experimental work, Deck and Wilson (2008) found evidence of rockets and feathers reactions 
to changes in input costs.
13  Our data set allows us to investigate the downward stickiness of a 
generic market where sellers cannot communicate, all information is perfectly observable, and 
costs are held constant.   
To test for asymmetric responses to a rival’s price change we adjust our VAR model to 
distinguish “positive” adjustment and “negative” adjustment as shown in equations (4) and (5).  
If a seller observes his rival’sprice increaselast period, which means  0 _ 1    t rival P , we use 

t P  to represent his responses.  Similarly, if a seller observes his rival’s price fall in the last 
period, which means 0 _ 1    t rival P , we use 

t P  to represent his responses.  By testing the 
coefficients on 

t P  and 





























































































































, 1     t t t P P P  
Based upon Wald tests, we conclude that of the 20 subjects who respond to their rival, 12 
respond symmetrically to price increases and decreases (8 of 11 with positively correlated buyer 
values and 4 of 9 with negatively correlated buyer values).  Four subjects exhibit a rockets and 
feathers response (one with positively correlated buyer values and three with negatively 
correlated buyer values).  The other four subjects can be described as exhibiting a bricks and 
balloons pattern as their prices rose more slowly than they fall (two with positively correlated 
buyer values and two with negatively correlated buyer values).   
Conclusions 
Chen and Riordan (2008) demonstrate that competition can, in certain circumstances, actually be 
expected to charge higher prices than would occur under monopoly.  While earlier theoretical 
work has drawn the same general conclusion, those papers have relied upon market frictions.  By 
contrast, Chen and Riordan (2008) do not introduce structural frictions, but rather consider the 
distribution of buyer values for differentiated products.  This redirection is consistent with 
technological advances that enable buyers to comparison shop online and allow firms to better 
identify buyer values and create differentiated products.   
                                                            
13 Similar to our experimental design, Deck and Wilson (2008) use a posted offer institution with computerized 
buyers who visit the market every few seconds and allow sellers to update their prices at any point.    16 
 
Before relying upon any model to make inference, one must subject the model to testing.  At 
current, some empirical evidence is consistent with the results of Chen and Riordan (2008); 
however, it can be difficult to determine if any particular naturally occurring market fits the 
necessary assumptions identified in the theoretical model.  Therefore, this paper uses controlled 
experiments to test Chen and Riordan (2008).  The laboratory offers a means to exogenously 
manipulate the model’s identified factors and test its predictions.   
Our experimental findings indicate the effect of competition does depend on the degree of 
correlation in buyer values, consistent with the theoretical predictions.  However, we also 
observe two unexpected behavioral patterns.  First, subject sellers of differentiated products 
overreact to competition in both of our buyer value environments.  Second, prices are low when 
buyer values are negatively correlated, regardless of the market structure we implement.  These 
two findings work against the nominal price increase predicted by Chen and Riordan (2008) and 
in fact we would have wrongly concluded that their model’s predictions did not hold if we had 
only observed markets with negative correlation or had only focused on duopoly markets. 
Our within subject experimental design also enables us to look for possible hysteresis effects on 
market structure.  Should such effects exist, one would need to be concerned with the path that 
led to a particular market structure when predicting behavior in a given market.  However, we 
find no evidence of such effects, suggesting that a two good monopolist forced to spin off one 
product line will behave the same as a former single good monopolist facing a new entrant and 
competitors that have never been in a monopoly situation.        
In terms of pricing dynamics in our duopoly markets, we find that prices are generally stable 
over time regardless of buyer values.  However, differentiated product duopolists are more 
sensitive to their rival’s behavior when buyer values are positively correlated, as expected, since 
the market share effect of a price change is relatively large in this case.  This greater sensitivity is 
manifest both in the size and speed of the response function.  In a few of our markets we observe 
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